Israel’s attack on Iran: The nuclear ‘point of no return’ and the operational window

In the early hours of 13 June, Israel launched a surprise attack on Iran – Operation “Rising Lion” (a reference to the Biblical verse, Numbers 23:24: “Behold, the people rise like a lioness”). It targeted hundreds of locations across the Islamic Republic, including nuclear facilities, missile sites and military bases, resulting in the deaths of several of Iran’s most senior commanders and leading nuclear scientists.

What we know so far about the conflict between Israel and Iran.https://t.co/C5J0RStahA

— The Age (@theage) June 15, 2025

The operation, effectively a declaration of war on Iran, carries major strategic implications.

Israel has taken a tremendous risk, aiming to place the final stamp on a dramatic shift in the regional balance of power. For this to happen, a diplomatic “end game” in the form of an agreement that eliminates Iran’s capacity to destabilise the region must follow the military campaign.

Background: Decades of hostility

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has viewed Western civilisation as the enemy, frequently using hostile rhetoric to describe the US (“the Great Satan”) and Israel (“the Little Satan”). Iran’s leaders and top military figures have threatened to destroy the Jewish state and promoted antisemitism and Holocaust denial. A clock in Tehran counts down to Israel’s predicted end in 2040, as foretold by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Here's how the Iranian Revolution of 1979 unfolded. pic.twitter.com/Mr5WezGe2h

— Al Jazeera English (@AJEnglish) February 7, 2019

Iran also created a network of proxies near Israel’s borders – Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shi’ite militias in Syria and Iraq, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen – arming and training them to strike Israel on command.

The terrorist organisations behind the deadly 7 October, 2023, massacre – Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) – are also part of this network. Iran and its proxies helped plan and prepare for that attack.

Simultaneously, since the late 1980s, Iran has been methodically advancing a clandestine nuclear weapons program. By 2003, this effort was progressing rapidly toward producing five atomic bombs (the AMAD plan).

After the US withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) in May 2018, Tehran accelerated its uranium enrichment to near weapons-grade levels (60%, technically just a tiny jump from weapons grade of 90%), while consistently obstructing and deceiving the UN’s investigations into its military nuclear activities.

Iran has always maintained that its nuclear program is purely for civilian use.

All the while, Israel and Iran engaged in years of escalating tit-for-tat hostilities that remained below the threshold of full-scale war.

Iran and Hezbollah initiated rocket attacks and terrorist bombings of Israeli and Jewish targets abroad, including the 1994 bombings in Argentina. Meanwhile, Israel targeted nuclear sites with drones, assassinated nuclear scientists inside Iran, and eliminated Iranian officials across the region.

The rationale: The Begin Doctrine

Israel is the only country to have pre-emptively attacked an emerging nuclear threat – and it has done so three times. The current campaign against Iran’s nuclear program, which Israel sees as an existential threat, is a direct continuation of this longstanding policy.

On 7 June, 1981, Israeli jets destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor (Operation Opera). Then-prime minister Menachem Begin explained:

“We will not, under any circumstances, allow the enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against our people.”

He later added:

“This attack will be a precedent for every future government in Israel.”

Thus, the “Begin Doctrine” was born – asserting Israel’s right to strike first against existential threats, but also sparking debate over international law and pre-emptive self-defence.

On 6 September, 2007, Israel again struck a nuclear facility, this time in Syria (Operation Outside the Box), near Deir ez-Zur. This North Korean-made reactor would have been capable of producing plutonium for an atomic bomb. Israel also targeted chemical weapons facilities in Syria in 2024 – another application of the Begin Doctrine.

The trigger: The nuclear ‘point of no return’

In recent months, Iran reportedly accelerated its nuclear weapons project, putting it just one decision away from building nuclear weapons.

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) June 2025 report, Iran’s stockpile of 60%-enriched uranium reached 408.6kg in February – enough for nine nuclear warheads. This level of enrichment has no civilian use.

Meanwhile, US intelligence discovered that Iranian scientists were working on a shortcut to rapidly weaponise this uranium.

In addition, the IAEA concluded that 20 years ago Iran had conducted implosion tests at undeclared sites (a crucial step in the development of the warhead). And the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) opposition group revealed a few days ago that Supreme Leader Khamenei had been overseeing a secret warhead development initiative, the “Kavir Plan,” for 15 years, aimed at mounting nuclear warheads on long-range (3000km) missiles.

The final straw came when Israeli intelligence intercepted proof that Iran had obtained trigger components and was conducting successful weaponisation experiments. For Israel, this crossed the “point of no return” – necessitating immediate action.

Diplomatic timing

The return of Donald Trump to a second term as President in late 2024 was also pivotal for Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who approved the attack plan in November, soon after Trump’s election victory. Close coordination with the Trump administration led to swift US resupply of munitions and deployment of THAAD missile defences in Israel.

The Israeli attack on Iran was nearly launched in April and again in May, but was postponed for undisclosed reasons.

On 19 March, Trump’s decision to initiate talks on a new nuclear deal initially signalled a US preference for diplomacy. However, Israel convinced the US to insist that Iran completely dismantle its uranium enrichment capabilities – a demand Tehran rejected.

As his initial 60-day ultimatum expired, President Trump attended Les Misérables in New York – possibly a subtle signal missed by Tehran. By then, he already knew Israel was about to strike.

‘We knew everything’: Trump says he tried to ‘save’ Iran.https://t.co/cfLGy2MUgm

— The Age (@theage) June 14, 2025

On 12 June, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution declaring Iran in non-compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty – providing legal cover for Israel’s action and paving the way for UN Security Council intervention to follow.

The operational window

Several converging factors created the conditions for Israel’s attack:

1. Weather: Summer in the Middle East offers clear nights and optimal visibility for Israel’s (and American) advanced surveillance and airstrike capabilities.
2. Airspace freedom: Israeli jets faced minimal resistance flying over Syria and Iraq all the way to Tehran. Following Iran’s missile attacks on Israel in 2024, the IDF retaliated by disabling critical Iranian air defences (most notably, taking out of action radars of the S-300 anti-aircraft systems), leaving Iran vulnerable. US officials described Iran’s airspace as “essentially naked”, while (former) Israeli defence minister Yoav Gallant commented recently that “there is no goalkeeper in the Iranian goal”.
3. Sabotaging ballistic missile production: In October 2024, Israel also neutralised Iran’s planetary mixer machines, essential for the production of solid fuel for ballistic missiles. This, and other activities, dramatically reduced Iran’s ability to restock its long-range missiles, many of which were “spent” during attacks on Israel in April and October 2024. Recently, there were signs that Iran was trying to quickly restock and resume production of those missiles. Israel did not want to wait for this to happen.
4. Syrian regime collapse: The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 further opened the skies. His successor al-Sharaa expelled Iranian forces and dismantled their anti-aircraft systems, giving Israel near-total air superiority. Israel used the weakness of the Damascus government to destroy other possible threats to its jet fighters, such as residual anti-aircraft military capabilities from the previous regime, as well as to defuse similar threats in Iraq.
5. Diminished regional proxy threats: In Gaza, Israel’s campaign since October 2023 significantly weakened Hamas. In the north, Israel surprised Hezbollah in September 2024 with a campaign of exploding pagers followed by targeted airstrikes and a ground invasion, dismantling most of the terrorist group’s military capabilities. A ceasefire ensued in November, with a new Lebanese government now working to disarm Hezbollah.

How will this end?

By May, the IDF completed its preparations. With diplomatic and operational conditions aligned, Israel struck on 12 June. The campaign is expected to last at least two weeks.

Regional actors – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Jordan – are watching closely, asking: Can Israel critically undermine Iran’s ability to acquire a nuclear bomb in the future – and by doing so, also remove this threat to their own countries?

Will Iran’s regional standing be significantly diminished, and will the European nations party to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) trigger the “snapback” measures found in UN Security Council resolutions to reimpose universal sanctions on Iran?

Will the US actively join the offensive (it is currently assisting Israel mostly in defence)? Or alternatively, will Israel be forced to halt before achieving its goals? Could this operation help end the Gaza conflict and pave the way for normalisation with Saudi Arabia?

Above all, recent wars in Gaza and Ukraine show that without a diplomatic conclusion, military action may only lead to prolonged suffering. Israel and the US hope that weakening Iran’s strategic assets, and genuine fears in Tehran regarding the regime’s survival, will pressure the ayatollahs into negotiations and an agreement, leaving Iran without enrichment and significantly weaker.

Some – both inside and outside Iran – hope this attack might even trigger the fall of the Islamic Republic (with Israel and the US dropping hints that Khamenei himself may be targeted). Yet, regimes are not toppled by foreign air forces, and without a viable domestic opposition force leading the charge for regime change, that outcome remains unlikely.